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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdicti>;."

<.

;

-

^ mneal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED
PLAINTIFF APPELLANT CLAIMS 'I'll A I FillTIN \ l COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF APPELLANT HAD
FAIIM' »" MEET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING A SUBSTANTIAL
MATERIAL

CHANGE

Ol

( IKfl I "MS 'I ,\N( V

MM 1 WAS

NOT

FORESEEABLE AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE.
Standard of Review
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial cow

•

->f discretion. "The

determination of the trial court that there has or has not been a substantial change of circumstances
. . . is presumed v a I • 11 '' Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1998) (citing Wells v. Wells. 871
P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994)).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Ulal. Cw.L A,,.. § 3D-T -c> (7)(g)(i) (effectiveMay 1, 1995).
"The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantia i. liungo and new orders regarding
;iI iniony based upon a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time o
divorce."
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of Case

This is a case that was heard by the trial court on the Plaintiff Appellant's Petition to Modify
the Divorce Decree to terminate his alimony obligation to the Defendant Appellee. The Plaintiff
Appellant filed his petition on October 9, 1995. This appeal is from the trial court's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order denying the Plaintiff Appellant's Petition to Modify entered
on August 10, 1998, following a bench trial on June 18, 1998.
B.

Course of Proceeding

The Defendant Appellee agrees with the Plaintiff Appellant's statement of the course of the
proceeding.
C.

Disposition at Trial Court

The trial court entered an order:
1.

That the Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce be and the same is hereby denied, and

2.

That counsel for the Defendant/Appellee be and he is hereby granted leave to file an
application for attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein by way of affidavit for
further consideration by the Court and the Plaintiff/Appellant, by and through his
counsel, be and he is hereby granted leave to file such opposition thereto as he shall
deem necessary, following which the matter may be submitted to the Court
determination.

(Appellant's Addendum 5).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant Appellee agrees with the Plaintiff Appellant's statement of the facts with the
following additions, corrections, and modifications.
1.

The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered on or about

November 4, 1983.
2.

The trial court in the original divorce action found that if the Defendant Appellee,

hereinafter "Ms. Petersen", became certificated as a teacher then her "ability to produce income
would approximate one fourth (1/4) to one fifth (1/5) that of the Plaintiff in the event she could
secure a teaching contract which is speculative at best." (Appellee's Addendum 1, f 5, p. 4).
3.

The trial court in the original divorce action found that "for a period of approximately

17 years, the defendant has not been employed outside of the parties' home but is in all probability
now required to seek employment and additional education and training to assist in providing partial
support for herself and the parties' minor children." (Appellee's Addendum 1, If 11, p.6).
4.

The Plaintiff Appellant, hereinafter "Dr. Petersen", had gross income in 1997 of

approximately $735,000. (Appellant's Addendum 6, Tf 6, p.2).
5.

Ms. Petersen's 1997 income, exclusive of alimony, was approximately $40,400.

(Appellant's Addendum 6, Tf 8, p.3).
6.

Ms. Petersen's 1997 income was approximately one eighteenth (1/18) of Dr.

Petersen's 1997 income.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT IN THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE ACTION

FOUND THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY MS. PETERSEN WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT, THEREFORE, HER SUBSEQUENT
EMPLOYMENT WAS FORESEEABLE.
The applicable statute requires as a threshold matter that there be a substantial material
change in circumstance that was not foreseeable at the time of the divorce to support a petition to
modify an existing divorce decree. Ms. Petersen's employment was not only a foreseeable event it
was anticipated that her employment would be required and the trial court specifically so found. The
trial court also found that there would be a significant disparity in the incomes of the parties, which
indeed occurred. Therefore, Dr. Petersen has not met his threshold burden as required by law.
II.

DR. PETERSEN FAILED TO SHOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN A

SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFYING
A MODIFICATION OF THE ALIMONY AWARD
The party seeking to modify an alimony award bears the burden of proving that there has
been a change of circumstance which justifies the modification. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d
156, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Dr. Petersen failed to meet that burden. Assuming arguendo that
Ms. Petersen's employment at her income level was not foreseeable at the time of the divorce, her
subsequent employment would not justify the reduction or elimination of alimony. The trial court
found that Ms. Petersen lives in the same residence; has the same basic expenses; and has
continuously pursued employment to help her meet her expenses and provide for her support.
(Addendum 6 to Appellant's Brief, f 12, p.4-5). In addition, the child support of $1800 per month
she was receiving has terminated with the emancipation of all the parties' minor children.
4

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT IN THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE ACTION

FOUND THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY MS. PETERSEN WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT, THEREFORE, HERSUBSEQUENT
EMPLOYMENT WAS CLEARLY FORESEEABLE.
Dr. Petersen filed his Petition to Modify on October 9, 1995 requesting that his alimony
obligation to Ms. Petersen, be terminated. (Record 15-18). U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) which governs
modification of alimony awards became effective on May 1,1995. Id. The Utah Court of Appeals
determined that the 1995 amendments to U.C.A. §30-3-5 were substantive legal changes and
therefore only governed petitions to modify which were filed after the enactment date of May 1,
1995. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that where an original petition to
modify was filed prior to the effective date and amended after the effective date the new statute did
not apply.) Accordingly, the court correctly applied the standard codified in U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(g)(i)
to Dr. Petersen's petition to modify.
U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) requires a threshold showing that the alleged substantial material
change of circumstance be something that was not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Moon v.
Moon, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah App. 1999). Under this standard, Dr. Petersen must show that
the alleged change in circumstance be something that was not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
Dr. Petersen simply cannot meet this burden because Ms. Petersen's future employment was
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. The trial court in the original divorce action found that Ms.
Petersen would "in all probability" need to seek employment to assist in supporting herself and her
children. (Appellee's Addendum 1, ^ 11, p.6). The trial court explicitly anticipated and found that
Ms. Petersen would need to become employed to assist in the support of herself and her children.
5

The trial court also found that Ms. Petersen's ability to produce income would be
approximately one fourth (1/4) to one fifth (1/5) that of Dr. Petersen in the event she could secure
a teaching contract which is speculative. (Appellee's Addendum 1, f 5, p.4). The trial court correctly
anticipated that Ms. Petersen's ability to produce income would be a fraction of Dr. Petersen's
income producing ability. The actual disparity was grossly underestimated, Ms. Petersen's income
turned out to be closer to one eighteenth (1/18) of Dr. Petersen's income.
The amendment became effective on May 1, 1995 and governs Dr. Petersen's petition to
modify which was filed on October 9, 1995. The case on which Dr. Petersen substantially relies,
Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990) was decided prior to the enactment
of the 1995 amendment and is therefore inapplicable to this case. Dr. Petersen simply cannot show
that Ms. Petersen's employment, at her current income level, was not a foreseeable event at the time
of the divorce. The trial court explicitly found that Ms. Petersen would probably need to secure
gainful employment and that her income would probably be one fourth (1/4) to one fifth (1/5) that
of Dr. Petersen.

Her employment as a school teacher or at a similar income level in another

occupation was not only foreseeable it was anticipated by the trial court as being "in all probability"
required. (Appellee's Addendum 1, f 11, p.6). The trial court properly identified the fact that the
original findings anticipated Ms. Petersen's employment. (Addendum 6 to Appellant's Brief, K 10,
p.4). The only factor that was arguably not foreseeable was the huge disparity between the parties'
incomes.
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II.

DR. PETERSEN FAILED TO SHOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN A

SUBSTANTIAL

MATERIAL

CHANGE

OF

CIRCUMSTANCE

JUSTIFYING A MODIFICATION OF THE ALIMONY AWARD.
Even assuming arguendo that Ms. Petersen's employment was not foreseeable, her
employment is not a substantial material change that justifies a reduction of alimony. Once a court
addresses the foreseeability question, that court may find that a party's employment is a substantial
material change of circumstance if such employment creates a change in financial condition that is
comparatively significant. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that "'A relative change in the
income and expenses of the parties, if comparatively significant, can amount to a substantial change
in circumstances' justifying a modification of a prior alimony award."

Throckmorton v.

Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Jeppson v. Jeppson. 684 P.2d 69, 70
(Utah 1984). The question then becomes whether Ms. Petersen's employment has created a relative
change in income and expenses that is comparatively significant. The trial court found that Ms.
Petersen's employment did not amount to such a substantial change because of a number of
balancing financial factors.
The trial court's findings state:
That the circumstances have not materially or substantially changed since the entry of the Decree
of Divorce herein, i.e., she resides in the same residence that was the parties' marital residence at the
date of divorce; her basic expenses have not substantially or materially changed; she has accepted
and continuously pursued her employment in order to meet her monthly expenses and provide for
her support and maintenance and that she has not received and retained substantial funds by way of
gift or inheritance which have altered or affected her circumstances significantly. (Addendum 6 to
Appellant's Brief, K 12, p.4-5).
7

The trial court also found that Ms. Petersen no longer receives any child support because of
the emancipation of the parties' youngest child. (Addendum 6 to Appellant's Brief, Tf 4, p.2).
The Appellant's brief states that Ms. Petersen currently makes "between 46 and 47 percent
of the total income earned by Dr. Petersen" in 1983 (the time of divorce). (Appellant's Brief, p. 12)
The Appellant ignores, however, the economic reality which is that 1983 dollars are not the same
as 1999 dollars. The cost of living has increased greatly in the 16 years and will in all probability
continue to increase. The Appellant's failure to acknowledge this fact underscores the error of the
Appellant's position. The trial court properly found that Ms. Petersen's employment has not created
a substantial material change in circumstance. The trial court found that Ms. Petersen's monthly
expenses were $4700. (Addendum 6 to Appellant's Brief, If 11, p.4). The trial court further found
that Ms. Petersen required both her employment income and her alimony income to maintain those
monthly expenses. The trial court, which has the facts before it, is in the best position to make a
factual determination as to whether there has been a substantial material change of circumstances.
Once that decision has been made it should not be upset or overturned absent clear error. No such
error can be found in this case. Here, the trial court properly and realistically considered the
financial circumstances of Ms. Petersen and declined Dr. Petersen's request to terminate alimony.
CONCLUSION
The determination of the trial court must be upheld on two independent grounds. First, Dr.
Petersen failed to meet the statutory requirement that Ms. Petersen's employment

was not

foreseeable at the time of divorce. Dr. Petersen alleged as the sole ground for his appeal that Ms.
Petersen's employment constituted a substantial material change of circumstance that was not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Yet the trial court in the original divorce action explicitly
found that it was probable that Ms. Petersen would need to become employed to assist in the support
8

of herself and her children. Accordingly, the trial court properly recognized that existing law
requires the denial of Dr. Petersen's petition to modify.
Second, assuming arguendo that Ms. Petersen's employment was not foreseeable, Dr.
Petersen failed to meet his burden of showing that there has been a substantial material change. The
trial court weighed the evidence presented by the parties and determined that Ms. Petersen's
circumstances had not changed such as to justify a termination in alimony. 1
Statement of Relief Sought
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellee respectfully requests the following relief:
1.

That the trial court's ruling be affirmed; and

2.

That this court award Appellee attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of
this appeal.
DATED: July 7,1999.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWEWSON

,ARK W. SESSIONS
OTHEW A(STEWARD
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

1

At trial, Dr. Petersen claimed that the divorce decree should be modified by reason of a
"substantial inheritance" received by Ms. Petersen. That claim was properly rejected by the trial
court and has apparently been abandoned by Dr. Petersen in his appeal.
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parties respective children reach
. --s or graduate tivn

the age of eightee,

lu^h uchji 1,

whichever event later occurs,

the

] Ill

The run j i t finds that the Defendant should be awarded

sum

<

permanent alimony
•'in11

I "'

Thousand

Dollar*.

commence and be payable on November

<:,onf i nlit

UCLUU

calendar

month

thereafter until the earlier of her death or remarriage.
12.

The Court finds that

lump sum property

Defendant should be awarded

settlement award
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payable

equal monthly

installments

i I One Thousand Dollars

interest, from iln.1 U.JI
13.

($1,000.00) each without

i ' f 11 li.'ivul , •

;! ~

:J

.

The Court finds that the Defenaan:

awarded as her sole and separate property, without claim from the
Plaintiff, the

roperty and adjacent

lot, subject

existing first mortgage obixgai

i,

approximate sum of One Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Dollars
($142,000 . nil in wtu n.iiii i in Hi I e rid .in ii

ihmilrl In ordered to assume,

pay, discharge and hold the Plaintiff harmless frou
f i ni I", r I* ii r f; 1

market value of said

Three Hundred .
14.

perty, approximates
000.00).

The Court finds that the Defendant should li. UWUILILJ U
.- - separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff,

_., garniture, furn is.
property located in ar

liances

an'; personal

. .*> residence, real property

hereinabove described, provided, however, the Plaintiff should be
awarded at> hi

.i-i

.MI oL^arui i* \ i njir • > , without claim from i v

Defendant, the parties 1 wooden secretary bookcase, video ._•...
.*•::• svstem, yellow overstuffed *
parties

v.j::e- tabic luciu ml

. and ottoman and
' family room at said

residence.
i

Che Court finds that the Defendant should be awarded as

her sole and separate k^c
the parties"

IHITT

.nil i'i.i -In I M . r r r n
Court finds

the Plaintiff,

Surburban

vehicle

and* the parties

by the parties 1 .children

1111,", nr,ed

in addition, that the i" 1 a

1

I, i 1J

I,.,\ I I „

The
i:

1

benefit

of a 1983 -JBuick automobile

corporation

and

that

all

through his

expenses,

including

professional
insurance,

maintenance and operation charges are paid by such professional
corporation.
16.

The Court finds that the Defendant should be awarded as

her sole and separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff,
existing

life insurance

Defendant' is the owner

on the Plaintiffs

life wherein the

of

Such award

such policies.

shall

include but shall not be limited to, the right to receive cash
values

therefrom,

designate beneficiaries

thereunder

and all

rights, duties and responsibilities appurtenant thereto.
17.

The Court finds that the parties should retain an equal

ownership of the J&E Investments partnership in which the parties
have a

twenty-five percent

(25Z) interest

each, rather than

making a distribution thereof which could result in income tax
consequences not of their own making, choosing or design.
18.

The Court finds that the Defendant should be awarded

any and all interest in and to any pension, profit sharing,
retirement or similar plan or benefit, to which she may become
entitled by reason of her future employment or otherwise, without
claim from the Plaintiff.
19.

The Court finds that the existing b enefits credited to

the account of the Plaintiff in the Gary V. Peterson, M.D.,
Professional Corporation pension and profit sharing plan, exceeds
Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00) and that the Defendant has a
vested interest to the same to the extent of ninety percent (90Z)
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thereof.

The Court further finds that additional contributions

have been made during the calendar year 1983 to the account of
the Plaintiff and that in order to fairly distribute the assets
of

the

parties,

the

Plaintiff

should

be

awarded

all

such

retirement plan benefits without claim from the Defendant,
20.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded as

his sole and separate property without claim from the Defendant,
all right, title and interest in and to Gary V. Peterson, M.D., a
professional

corporation.

receivable of

The Court

finds

such corporation exceed Forty

that

the accounts

Thousand Dollars

($40,000.00) in addition to ether and related assets, including
the Plaintiff's
Four

Thousand

capital
One

contribution thereto of approximately

Hundred

Dollars

($4,100.00)

and

cash

of

approximately Two Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($2,600.00) as of
July 6, 1983.
21.. The Court finds that following the commencement of the
above-entitled action, the Plaintiff executed and implemented a
family trust known as the Gary V. Peterson Family Irrevocable
Trust with the primary purpose of providing educational funds for
the parties' minor children.
Plaintiff

transferred

The Court further finds that the

to such trust a certain X-ray machine,

related equipment, supplies and accessories which has and will
continue to generate income in excess of the payments thereon.
The Court

finds,

in addition,

that

the Plaintiff

should be

awarded as his sole and separate property, without claim from the
Defendant, any and all interest in and to such trust assets,
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including the right to revoke such trust in the event the same is
revocable, as the Plaintiff shall deem advisable.
22.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded as

his sole and separate property, without claim from the Defendant,
the parties1

right,

title

and

interest

in and

to

the real

property, improvements and furniture, fixtures, appliances and
personal property located in and at the Yorkshire Condominium,
Ogden, Utah, the parties1 condominium at 4956 Quail Lane, Ogden,
Utah and the rental residence and real property located at 580
28th Street, Ogden, Utah and the Plaintiff should be ordered to
assume, pay and discharge any and all obligations existing in
connection

with

said

properties,

improvements

and

personal

property and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom.
23.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded as

his sole and separate property, the parties1 boat, motor and
trailer ^with
($4,200.00),
Partnership

a value
the
of

of

parties1

nominal

Four

Thousand

interest

value,

in

Peterson

Two

Hundred

Dollars

and

to

Biomass

Land

the

Development,

a

limited partnership of the value of Three Thousand .Six Hundred
Dollars ($3,600.00) and the Knowlwood Condominium, Ogden, Utah,
acquired by the Plaintiff following the separation of the parties
together with all furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances
located therein and thereat, with an approximate value of Three
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($3,700.00) all without claim from
the Defendant, provided however, the Plaintiff should be ordered
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to assume, pay and discharge any and all obligations connected
therewith and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom,
24.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded

the existing undivided one seventh (1/7) interest in and to the
parties' Bear Lake property

(the subject

of the Plaintiff's

parents1 trust) and further, that the Defendant should be ordered
and directed to convey her existing undivided one seventh (1/7)
interest therein to the parties' youngest minor child, Andrea
Kay, as Beneficiary pursuant to the same terms, provisions and
conditions as each of the other minor children own a one seventh
(1/7) interest therein and thereto.

The Court finds in addition

that the parties1 interest therein approximates Five Thousand One
Hundred

Forty-Two

Dollars

Hundred Fifty Dollars

($5,142.00)

and

Two

Thousand

Six

($2,650.00) representing the approximate

value of the furniture, furnishings and fixtures located therein
and thereat.
25.

The Court finds that each of the parties should be

awarded their own personal effects, wearing apparel, jewelry and
personal property currently in their possession without claim
from the other.
26.

The Court finds that the parties should file Federal

and State income tax returns for the calendar year 1983 on such
bases as are in the best interest of the parties and each party
should be ordered to pay that portion of any such tax assessment
and obligation attributable to the parties on the same ratio that
each such parties' income bears
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to the total

income of the

parties and in the event of any refund, rebate or allowance, such
should be divided between the parties on a like basis.
27.
of this

The Court finds that due to the income tax consequences
divorce

to

the parties, that

it

is

fair, just

and

equitable that the Plaintiff be permitted to claim the six (6)
minor children of the parties as deductions and exemptions for
Federal and State income .tax purposes for the taxable year 1983
and thereafter.
28.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be ordered to

assume, pay and discharge and hold the Defendant harmless from
the following debts and obligations incurred during the course of
the marriage of the parties:
A.

The

existing

second

mortgage

on

the

parties1

residence and real property located at 6039 Breeze Circle,
Ogden, Utah, in the approximate sum of Forty-Four Thousand
Dollars ($44,000.00);
B.

The existing loan secured by a third mortgage on

the parties1

residence and real property located at 6039

Breeze Circle, Ogden, Utah, in favor of Gary V. Peterson,
M.D., pension and profit sharing plan in the approximate sum
of Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) and other loans, if
any,

made

to

the

Plaintiff

by

said

pension

and

profit

sharing plan;
C.
the

An existing open account obligation to Texaco in

approximate

sum

of

Three

($350.00);
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Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

D.

The September and October, 1983 first mortgage

payments on the parties1 residence and real property at 6039
Breeze

Circle,

utility

bills,

Ogden,

Utah,

obligations

together
and

with

accounts

in

outstanding
connection

therewith;
E.

Outstanding open account charges incurred by the

parties for children1s clothing and accessories necessary
for the children's enrollment in public schools for the 1983
school year; and
F.

All personal expenses and obligations incurred for

the benefit of the Plaintiff since the separation of the
parties.
29.

That the Defendant should be ordered to assume, pay,

discharge and hold the Plaintiff harmless from, the following
bills and obligations incurred during the course of the parties1
marriage:.
A.

All open accounts, charge accounts and similar

obligations not hereinabove specifically ordered to be paid
by the Plaintiff; and
E.

All debts, obligations and charges incurred for

the use and benefit of the Defendant since the separation of
the parties, including loans from the Defendant's parents
and other relatives.
30.

The Court finds that the stipulation of the parties

arith respect to health, accident, medical and dental insurance on
and for the benefit of the parties' six (6) minor children, is
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fair, just and equitable and as such, the Plaintiff should be
ordered

to

provide

at

his

sole

cost

and

expense,

health,

accident, medical and dental insurance on and for the benefit of
the parties1

six (6) minor children, during his obligation of

support thereof, provided however, the Plaintiff shall be allowed
the

right

to

schedule

dental

and "medical

services

for

the

parties1 minor children other than emergency services and the
Defendant should be ordered to cooperate with the Plaintiff in
every

respect

services.

in

obtaining,

securing

and

scheduling

such

Each of the parties should be ordered to assume, pay

and discharge any and all obligations for such medical and dental
services not covered by such insurance on an equal basis.
31.

The Court finds that by reason of the substantially

equal division of the assets of the parties acquired during the
course of their marriage, that each of the parties should be
ordered to assume, pay and discharge their own costs and expenses
incurred in connection with the above-entitled action, including
attorney's fees.
32.

The Court finds that each of the parties should be

ordered to execute such deeds, conveyances, bills of sale and
other documents as may be necessary to transfer the property as
awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto.
Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court
now eakes the following:

•14-

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Plaintiff and the Defendant are entitled to be

awarded a Decree of Divorce each from the other, upon the grounds
of mental cruelty and that such divorce shall become final upon
its entry herein by the Clerk of the above-entitled court and
that

any

and

all

applicable

waiting

periods,

including

the

interlocutory period, shall be waived.
2.

That the Defendant is entitled to be awarded the care,

custody and control of the six (6) minor children of the parties,
to-wit:

Erick Scott; Cami Lyn; Stephanie Ann; Tifani Jill; Ryan

Mathew;

and,

Andrea

Kay;

subject

to

Plaintifffs

rights

of

reasonable visitation which should be awarded to the Plaintiff,
subject

to

the

conditions

and

requirements

of

the

exercise

thereof as hereinabove set forth in the Findings of Fact of the
Court.
3. ^ That
settlement

and

the award
the

of alimony,

division

of

the

child support,

property

assets acquired

and the

liabilities incurred during the course of the marriage of the
parties in accordance with the stipulation of the parties, read
into the record herein and as set forth in the Findings of Fact
of the Court, should be and are approved in all respects and
adopted as Conclusions of Law as if fully set forth hereat.
4.

That each of the parties hereto should be responsible

for and pay their own costs and expenses incurred in connection
herewith, including attorney's fees.
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5.
execute

That each pf the parties hereto should be ordered to
such

deeds,

conveyances,

bills

of sale

and other

documents as may be necessary to transfer the property as awarded
by the Court to the party entitled thereto.
6.

That the Court

should make and enter its Decree of

Divorce accordingly.
DATED this .

W day of -kfeL, 1983.
BY THE COURT:

CALVIN GOULD
Calvin Gould
District Judge
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WE3ER
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